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SYMPOSIUM
THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Sheila R. Foster* & Daniel Bonilla**
The classical liberal conception of property dominates the modern legal
and political imagination. The idea that property is a subjective and nearly
absolute right controls the way in which much of modern law and politics
understand this institution. It is common for citizens, politicians, and
academics to view property as an individual right that is limited only by the
rights of others and the public interest. The holder of this right is therefore
someone who can use, reap the benefits of, and dispose of her assets in the
manner she deems appropriate, provided the limits imposed by the legal
order and the common good are not violated.1 This right, moreover, is
essential for the exercise of individual autonomy. 2 Property enables and
reflects the decisions made by individuals with respect to their life plans.
Property provides the material substratum that allows people to construct
their identities and express their moral commitments. Individual autonomy
and property are thus deeply intertwined. Consequently, the classical
liberal concept of property imposes negative duties on both the state and
individuals. 3 Both should refrain from acting in such a way as to adversely
affect individual rights to property.
Despite its ubiquity in the modern legal and political consciousness, the
classical liberal conception of property competes with, and is challenged by,
* Albert A. Walsh Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Fordham University School of Law.
This symposium was sponsored by the Albert A. Walsh Chair in Real Estate, Land Use, and
Property Law. My deepest gratitude extends to Professor Daniel Bonilla, for conceiving of
the idea for this symposium, and Toni Fine, Assistant Dean for International Affairs at
Fordham, for her assistance in organizing a very successful intellectual gathering.
** Associate Professor and Co-director of the Public Interest Law Group, University of the
Andes School of Law, Bogotá, Colombia. He is currently the Leitner Center Distinguished
Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. LOREN LOMANSKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 111–51 (1987).
2. Eric Mack, Self-Ownership and the Right of Property, 73 MONIST 519 (1990).
3. Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and the Rule of Law: Classical Liberalism
Confronts the Modern Administrative State 6–10 (Aug. 5, 2009) (Hoover Inst. Task Force on
Property Rights), http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__
academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_
pro_062726.pdf.
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other forms of imagining the institution. Classical liberal property has been
sharply criticized by theoretical perspectives as diverse as egalitarian
liberalism, 4 socialism, 5 and communism. 6 These perspectives generally
challenge the classical liberal conception as incomplete or unjust. Critics
indicate, for example, that classical liberal property obscures the obligations
and connections that the subject has with the community, 7 or they
emphasize the negative consequences that this right has on the distribution
of wealth. 8 At the normative level, opponents of classical liberal property
offer a variety of alternatives, from the abolition of private ownership of the
means of production to strong government intervention in the rights to
property in order to achieve redistributive aims.
I. LEÓN DUGUIT AND THE IDEA OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
One of these alternative concepts, and perhaps one of the most suggestive
and influential of the twentieth century, is the social function of property.9
This way of understanding property was articulated paradigmatically by the
French jurist León Duguit 10 in a set of six lectures given in Buenos Aires in
1911. 11 At these conferences, Duguit argued that property is not a right but
rather a social function. 12 According to this view, property has internal

4. See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY
OWNERSHIP 125–84 (1994); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY ch. 12
(Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1988).
5. See P.J. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT
AND OF GOVERNMENT (Benjamin R. Tucker trans., 1876).
6. See KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 93–114
(Foreign Languages Publ’g House 1961) (1844).
7. See Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 165, 165–80 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991).
8. See generally MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2003);
Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism and the State, 24 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 187 (2007).
9. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit,
Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191 (2010).
10. León Duguit (1859–1928) was a professor of public law at the University of
Bordeaux beginning in 1886. For biographical information on Duguit, see José Luis
Monereo Pérez & José Calvo Gonzalez, Léon Duguit (1859-1928): Jurista de una Sociedad
en Transformación, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483, 483–86 (2005).
Duguit is considered to be the father of the social function of property. See UGO MATTEI,
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
INTRODUCTION 31 (2000); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Property Rights
Protection Act: Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 701
(1996); David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privitization: An Inquiry into
the Magnitude of Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at
83, 92.
11. See LEÓN DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES DEL DERECHO PÚBLICO Y PRIVADO
(Editorial Heliasta 1975) [hereinafter DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES]. Some of Duguit’s
works translated into English are LEÓN DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (Frida Laski &
Harold Laski trans., 1919) and Léon Duguit, Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty,
Contract, Liability, and Property, reprinted in THE CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES,
THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 65 (Layton Bartol
Register & Ernest Bruncken trans., Little, Brown, & Co. 1918).
12. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 236.
OF
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limits—not just external ones as in the case of the liberal right to property.13
The owner has obligations with respect to his things. He cannot do what he
wants with his property. He is obliged to make it productive. The wealth
controlled by owners should be put at the service of the community by
means of economic transactions.14 Consequently, the state should protect
property only when it fulfills its social function. When the owner is not
acting in a manner consistent with his obligations, the state should intervene
to encourage or to punish him. Taxation and expropriation are powerful
tools for achieving such ends. From this perspective, the state has both
negative and positive obligations with respect to property.
The idea of the social function of property is based on a description of
social reality that recognizes solidarity as one of its primary foundations.15
For Duguit, the weaknesses of the classical liberal theory of property stem
from the erroneous description of the individual and the society in which
she is based. Liberalism’s emphasis on the individual and her rights is, for
him, closely intertwined with the description it offers of human beings and
the political community. 16 In liberal thought, people are essentially
autonomous and rational beings. Individuals have the ability to articulate,
transform, and try to realize life plans by making use of reason.
Consequently, the political community is a voluntary creation of individuals
geared towards increasing the likelihood of autonomously and rationally
constructing their life plans. 17 The political community is the sum of the
individuals that compose it. Rights, like those of property, are the
instruments articulated to ensure that the state does not intervene unduly in
the continuous process of construction and revision of individual identity.
To Duguit, this conception of the subject and society loses sight of the fact
that the interdependence between people (which is nothing other than
solidarity) is the central element of social reality. 18 Solidarity is not a
political principle but a social fact.
For Duguit, a precise description of society makes clear that its members
have needs and capacities that are sometimes similar and other times
different. 19 The social division of labor is therefore crucial to ensuring the
satisfaction of these needs. In order for the people and the community to
flourish, each individual must comply with a series of functions determined
by the position she occupies in society. The theory of the social function of
property is thus, in the words of Duguit, “realist” and “socialist” 20: realist
in that it is based solely on facts that can be known empirically; socialist in
that it stems from basis of solidarity, that is, the interdependence that

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 179.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 180–84.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
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characterizes society. Duguit therefore draws explicitly on the positivism
of Auguste Comte 21 and the structural functionalism of Emile Durkheim. 22
Based on this functionalist description of society, Duguit challenges both
the individualism23 and the metaphysical nature 24 of the liberal right to
property. Both dimensions of liberal property, Duguit argues, are defined
in a paradigmatic way in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and
the Napoleonic Code. 25 Duguit considered the Declaration and the Code to
be the two legal-political documents most representative of liberal thought.
Duguit asserts that many jurists believe, wrongly, that these two texts
contain the principles from which a perfect and eternal legal system can be
derived, 26 an order that would have the same formal characteristics as
Euclidean geometry. 27 Thus, for Duguit, challenging how property is
conceived in these two sets of norms is challenging the core of liberal
law. 28 The two central norms on matters of property in this legal-political
framework are Article 2 of the Declaration and Articles 544 and 545 of the
Napoleonic Code. Article 2 of the Declaration states, “The purpose of all
civil associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible
rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to
oppression.” Articles 544 and 545 of the civil code of Napoleon affirm
that:
Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most
absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the
laws or statutes. No one can be compelled to give up his property, except
for the public good, and for a just and previous indemnity. 29

According to these norms, Duguit states, property is defined as an
individual, natural, and nearly absolute right, limited only by the legal order
and the public interest.
Duguit’s critique of the individualism of the liberal right to property has
three components. The first challenges the supposition from which the
liberal right to property departs: the existence of an isolated individual.30
For Duguit this is a premise that does not correspond with an accurate
description of reality. Human beings, when properly described, are not
isolated beings who seek to construct and realize their life plans alone. On
the contrary, they are deeply interconnected beings that need each other to

21. Id. at 176.
22. Id. at 182.
23. Id. at 237.
24. Id. at 174–76.
25. Id. at 172.
26. For an analysis of Duguit’s anti-formalist positions, see Mauricio García-Villegas,
Comparative Sociology of Law: Legal Fields, Legal Scholarships, and Social Sciences in
Europe and the United States, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 343, 349–56 (2006).
27. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 172.
28. For Duguit, civil law has four main components: liberty, property, contracts, and
torts. Id. at 183–84.
29. CODE NAPOLEON arts. 544–545 (Fr.).
30. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 178.
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meet their physical and spiritual needs. As mentioned, for Duguit,
interdependence is a key feature of social reality. 31
The second component of the argument makes explicit the inconsistency
that exists for Duguit between the idea of an isolated individual and the
right of property. 32 If people live separately from other members of
society, it does not make sense to speak of a right that imposes negative
duties on third parties. If human beings are monads that repel each other,
what is the goal, Duguit asks, of a right that forces other members of
society to refrain from intervening in the property of others?
The third and final component of Duguit’s critique challenges the
assumption that classical liberal property exists only to serve individual
interests. 33 Duguit finds it objectionable that this right protects only the
relationship between a subject and her property. Classical liberal property
obscures the connections between the economic needs of the community
and the wealth that is recognized and protected through the institution we
know as property. It should also serve the community. This does not mean
that Duguit is committed to a socialist political perspective or that he is
challenging capitalism. He is very clear to distance himself from the
former, and to accept the latter as a fact.34 For Duguit, putting property at
the service of the community means putting it into production. His
argument has nothing to do with state ownership of the means of production
or with class struggle. Normatively, Duguit is committed to what we might
call the “rule of productivity.” The wealth concentrated in property cannot
remain unproductive. The social consequences would be profoundly
negative. The needs of the community members would certainly not be
satisfied and social cohesion would be in jeopardy.
Duguit also criticizes the metaphysical character of the liberal right to
property. On one hand, he challenges the concept of a subjective right.35
For Duguit, this concept implies the existence of a will that is imposed on
another will. The existence of a subjective right implies the existence of a
duty to a third party. Thus, this type of right requires knowledge of the
nature of individual will, a criterion to measure it, and another to apply it.
Duguit states, however, that individual will cannot be known empirically.
All we can know are the external manifestations of the will of individuals.
Will is a metaphysical entity that cannot be grasped through the scientific
method. On the other hand, Duguit challenges the supposed natural
character of the classical liberal right to property. The jus-naturalism to
which classical liberalism is committed is incompatible with its positivism.
Natural rights are not made knowable through observation of the world;
they are normative criteria without empirical basis.
Nevertheless, the concept of the social function of property has not been
relevant in the theoretical discussion on the content and effects of property
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 181.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 175.
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alone. 36 This idea has also been incorporated by a significant number of
European and Latin American legal systems 37 and has been instrumental in
the political struggle that has occurred in some countries to achieve a fairer
distribution of land. 38 In Latin America, for example, the social function of
property was included in several constitutions,39 such as the Mexican,40 the
Colombian, 41 and the Brazilian, 42 and has been instrumental in justifying
the agrarian and urban reform projects developed in several countries in the
region. 43 As many of the papers published in this issue will show, the
social function of property has had interesting conceptual histories and
applications in Latin America.
II. THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION NORM IN U.S. PROPERTY LAW
In the United States, no legal norm includes explicitly the words “social
function of property.” However, some U.S. legal scholars consider that a
“social obligation” norm does exist in U.S. law, albeit perhaps only at the
margins of property jurisprudence. According to this norm, property
owners have social responsibilities to others that extend beyond the highly
individualized, and atomized, conventional account of property rights.44
The conventional account in U.S. law and theory situates the individual
owner as insulated from the demand by others in society and owing no
further obligation to them, except for the duty not to cause harm to others

36. Ugo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil Code, Property and Plunder: Time for a Latin
American Alliance to Resist the Neo Liberal Order, 5 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 8 (2005),
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=gj;
Ngai
Pindell,
Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United
States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2006); Schneiderman, supra note 10, at 83–109.
37. See, for example, the German constitution of 1949, Article 14(2). GRUNDGEZETZ FÜR
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 14, sec. 2
(Ger.); infra notes 40–42.
38. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 1–2 (2006); Rebecca Lubens, The Social
Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of German and U.S. Law (bepress Legal
Series, Working Paper No. 1607, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1607; Flavia
Santinoni Vera, The Social Function of Property Rights in Brazil (Latin Am. & Caribbean
Law. & Econ. Ass’n (ALACDE) Annual Papers, Berkeley Program in Law & Econ. 2006),
available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0tp371xs.
39. M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 205–06 (2004).
40. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.], 5 de Febrero
de 1917, art. 27.
41. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58.
42. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXIII (Braz.).
43. Thomas T. Ankerson & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function
Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 95 (2006).
44. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011);
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); Gregory S.
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
745 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005); Jedediah Purdy, People as
Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property,
56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1054–56 (2007).
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and their property. 45 Scholars have long pushed backed against this view,
situating property as central to organizing and shaping social relations, and
entailing obligations to non-owners and the community as a whole. 46 This
relational view of property is an important building block for how scholars
understand social obligation norms in U.S. property law.
The social obligation norm is a concept with much plasticity. The idea
that property owners owe affirmative obligations to the welfare of others,
and to societal welfare more generally, can map onto a number of different
ideological orientations, including classical liberalism. The obligation of
property owners to contribute, through taxation, to the provision of public
goods such as law enforcement, schools, and fire protection is a relatively
“thin” but stable version of the norm. 47 In a similar vein, from a law and
economics standpoint, the presence of market failures (such as free riders
and holdouts) might entail curtailing an owner’s dominion over his property
in order to promote and maximize public welfare. 48 Eminent domain has
often been justified on the grounds that allowing the government to acquire
or “take” private property under certain circumstances produces the most
economically efficient result for taxpayers. 49 One might also properly view
a libertarian conception of ownership as entailing a social obligation to
guarantee to all persons the resources necessary for individual autonomy
and personhood. 50 Such a view would not privilege the enforcement of the
rights of property owners if the law does not also guarantee sufficient
resources to non-property owners. 51
Regardless of the specific ideological orientation that one brings to this
idea of “social obligation,” it shares with Duguit’s idea of the “social
function” of property recognition of the interdependence of individuals
within a society and of the role that property has in promoting the common
good. At a minimum, the social obligation norm recognizes the ways in
which property is central to human interactions, human flourishing, and the
relationship between an individual and her community. 52 Beyond that
recognition, the scope of the social obligation norm is something that will
need further articulation in order to understand not only its normative
contours but also its practical application.
Professor Gregory Alexander has labored the most to develop the social
obligation norm in the U.S., and to distinguish “thin(ner)” versions of the
norm, such as those articulated above, from his “thick(er)” version.
Alexander develops the norm to entail an obligation on the part of property
45.
46.
47.
48.

Alexander, supra note 44, at 746–47.
See generally SINGER, supra note 44.
Alexander, supra note 44, at 753–57.
See, e.g., id. at 753; Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259 (2007).
49. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55–56 (6th ed. 2003);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81–82 (1986).
50. Dagan, supra note 48, at 1259–60 & nn.30–31 (citing Margaret Jane Radin’s
personhood account and John Rawls’s work).
51. Id. at 1260.
52. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 44, at 765–67; Dagan, supra note 48, at 1260–61.
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owners to provide to society those benefits and goods that society
reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing. 53 Developing this
norm requires a fairly thick conception of the relationship between an
individual and her community, a relationship which serves to anchor the
norm in a particular social reality. 54 Alexander’s articulation of this
relationship resonates very strongly with Duguit’s description of social
reality. 55 For Alexander, like Duguit, the individual is not an isolated, selfsufficient, social and political animal.
Rather, dependency and
interdependency are constitutive of the human condition and, importantly,
of the capacity of humans to flourish in society. 56 Building on the
“capabilities” approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, Alexander
argues that development of one’s capabilities is a human good that society
ought to promote through entitling each person to the material resources
required to nurture the capabilities essential to human flourishing. 57 That
each person has an obligation to others in the community to promote the
requisite capabilities necessary for human flourishing is based both on our
interdependence with one another and on our shared acknowledgement, as
rational moral beings, of the right of every being to develop these
capabilities. 58
Alexander’s robust, or thick, version of the social obligation norm is
forthrightly redistributive in its aims and implications. He recognizes that
“human flourishing requires distributive justice, the ultimate objective of
which is to give people what they need in order to develop the capabilities
necessary for living the well-lived life.” 59 As such, an owner’s social
obligation is to contribute to her community those benefits that the
community reasonably regards as necessary for its members’ development
of those human qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral
agents. 60 Alexander finds scattered throughout property doctrine examples
in which private property owners are required to sacrifice their ownership
interest in a way that comports with this social obligation norm and,
importantly, in instances where neither law and economics nor classical
liberal analysis can justify, or has a hard time justifying, such sacrifices. 61
According to Alexander, the thicker version of the social obligation norm is
at work (or potentially at work) in eminent domain cases and cases
adjudicating remedies for nuisance, both of which involve state-sanctioned
forced sales of private property for the common good or community best

53. Alexander, supra note 44, at 760–74.
54. Id. at 757.
55. Alexander’s robust conception of community, and the individual’s relationship
within it, was developed first in his work with Eduardo Peñalver. See generally Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
127 (2009).
56. Alexander, supra note 44, at 760–61.
57. Id. at 762–65, 767–68.
58. Id. at 768–70.
59. Id. at 768.
60. Id. at 774.
61. Id.
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interest. 62 He also invokes his social obligation concept to explain cases in
which the owner is prohibited from using his or her property in some way
that the community regards as against its collective interest—such as in the
case of historic preservation laws, environmental regulations, and beach
access rights under the public trust doctrine. 63
III. PROPERTY THROUGH A SOCIAL LENS
Both Duguit’s and Alexander’s work push against the classical liberal
impulse to cabin the “core” of property rights as aligned with individual
autonomy and to relegate the limitations on individual autonomy to the
“periphery” of property rights. 64 The classical liberal approach considers
the owner’s right to possess and use tangible things, and to exclude others
from possessing and using those things, as the core of the right to private
property, and requires that any limitations on that right be justified by
important societal interests. Another way of thinking about the structure of
the classical liberal version of the right to private property in U.S. law is
that it creates a strong, albeit rebuttable, presumption in favor of the
owner’s right to exclude; a presumption that can be overcome by important
societal interests. 65
Duguit and Alexander paint a much more complex picture of what is at
the core of the right to own property. 66 Property’s social function, and the
owner’s obligation to provide certain benefits to society, instead work as an
internal constraint on private property rights. As such, a society’s shared
values and moral commitments exist, perhaps uncomfortably, alongside the
owner’s right to exclude. The core of property, then, ideally reflects the
plurality of values that we as a society believe property should serve, and it
is up to the legal system to negotiate them in defining the contours of
private property rights. 67
What form this negotiation assumes will vary depending upon the legal,
political, and social culture of a particular society. This variance is what
makes a comparative examination of the ways these ideas and concepts
have played out so rich and fascinating. On May 14, 2011, we convened an
impressive group of scholars to examine the contemporary interpretations
and use of the social function of property in Latin America and its exclusion
or marginal inclusion in the U.S. In particular, we wanted to highlight and
examine the interpretations of the social function of property articulated
during the last two decades by some Latin American constitutional courts,
62. Id. at 775–82.
63. Id. at 791–810; see also id. at 810–15 (discussing implications for intellectual
property law).
64. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1737 (1976) (classical legal theory is concerned with identifying “core”
individual freedoms and a “periphery” of limitations on those freedoms).
65. See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964–67 (2009).
66. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Reply: The Complex Core of Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1063 (2009); see also supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
67. Alexander, supra note 66, at 1066.
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as well as the symbolic and material effects that these readings have had in
the region. Similarly, we wanted to scrutinize and analyze the concepts and
institutions through which the social function of property has entered the
U.S. legal system and explore why these concepts and institutions have had
such a limited influence. Finally, we sought to identify the tensions and
connections that the social function of property has with relatively new
legal concepts like the ecological function of property, and to explore its
connections with various historical discourses and social structures in the
U.S. and Latin America.
A. Contemporary and Theoretical Approaches
to the Social Function of Property
The papers in this issue are organized in two sections. The first,
“Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to the Social Function of
Property,” is composed of four articles. Gregory Alexander’s paper
presents an analysis of some of the major theoretical perspectives in the
United States that defend the idea that property inherently includes social
obligations. 68 Alexander judiciously examines the work of Hanoch Dagan,
Joseph William Singer, and Jedediah Purdy. In his analysis, Alexander
seeks to clarify whether these theories of the social function of property
appeal to a monism or pluralism of values in order to justify their
assumptions. This is a topic that Alexander believes has received little
attention and is central to assessing the plausibility of each of these
perspectives. Alexander seeks to determine whether these theories are
based on a single value (autonomy, for example) or if they are justified by
multiple values (autonomy, community, and equality, among others).
However, Alexander’s article is not just descriptive, analytical, and
critical; it is also normative. Alexander argues that normative pluralism is
morally superior to normative monism. A theory of the social function of
property that is justified by and seeks to realize multiple values is capable
of recognizing the different spheres that make up society and the different
values that should control them. This type of theory also has the ability to
interpret property in a manner that accommodates the characteristics and
normative requirements made in each of these realms (social, family, and
work, for example). Consequently, in his article, Alexander examines the
significance of the concepts of normative pluralism and monism in light of
contemporary moral theory, presents a taxonomy of theories of the social
function of property that draws on these two concepts, and examines the
problem of the incommensurability of values that supposedly affects the
theories committed to normative pluralism.
The essay by Nestor Davidson examines the dominant political and legal
discourses on property in the United States. 69 Davidson argues that the
68. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017
(2011).
69. See Nestor M. Davidson, Sketches for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social
Function of Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053 (2011).
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individualist liberal interpretation advocated by James Madison and the
republican interpretation defended by Thomas Jefferson are the axes around
which the U.S. debate on property has historically revolved. Davidson also
argues, though, that there is a third perspective that has been given much
less attention but that has had important symbolic effects in the legal
community: that advocated by Alexander Hamilton. Davidson argues that
Hamilton defends the idea that property must have social obligations. In
Davidson’s view, Hamilton defends the idea that property should be used in
ways that benefit the community and that conflicts over property must be
resolved, protecting existing rights in favor of promoting the development
of the community.
Eduardo Peñalver offers an analysis of the relationship between property
and memory. 70 Peñalver structures his analysis around the distinction
between the memory of property and the memory in property. The first
refers to how individuals or communities recall an object that they once
owned. The second refers to the memories that have become part and
parcel of the property. Peñalver also argues that both can be divided into
physical memory or distributive memory. Physical memory is connected to
particular objects that were owned and remembered by an individual or
community, a house or a farm, for example; distributive memory is related
to forms of allocation of property transferred inter-generationally and that
influence the political and economic structure of a society, such as
feudalism or capitalism. Finally, Peñalver examines the relationship
between each of these categories and the law. Thus, for example, he studies
the relationship between memory of or about property and adverse
possession and taxes. In Peñalver’s conception, the analysis of the
relationship between memory and property will make explicit some of the
social functions of property that usually remain in the margins of the social,
political, and legal community.
The article by Colin Crawford has as its main objective the defense of a
normative theory of the social function of property. 71 For Crawford, a
proper interpretation of this institution should seek to facilitate the
flourishing of all citizens of a political community. To justify his argument,
Crawford draws on the theory of justice advocated by Amartya Sen.
Consequently, Crawford examines the relationship between property and
the capacities that human beings should develop in order to exercise their
autonomy. Crawford also argues that to comply with its objective, a theory
of the social function of property that has human flourishing as its main
goal must be closely connected with the concept of sustainable
development. For Crawford, the ecological function of property must be
one of the dimensions of the category “social function of property.”
Finally, Crawford analyzes the connections between the doctrine of “socioenvironmentalism” and the social function of property. Crawford argues
that this doctrine has multiple sources, from U.S. environmental law to the
70. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011).
71. See Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to
Flourish, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (2011).
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theory of environmental human rights to the global movement for
environmental justice. Nevertheless, Crawford also points out that this
doctrine originated in Latin America from the region’s experience with the
application of and theoretical reflection on the social function of property.
For Crawford, judicious examination of the contemporary forms the
institution has acquired must go through a social-environmental analysis in
Latin America.
B. The Social Function of Property at Work in Latin America
The second section, “The Social Function of Property in Latin America:
Legal and Case Law Developments,” is composed of three articles. In the
first article of this section, Daniel Bonilla argues that the structure of the
legal regime of property in Colombia has been shaped by liberalism. 72 A
genealogical analysis of the recent history of the legal forms that define and
regulate property, Bonilla argues, provides evidence for three key periods in
the creation and consolidation of the right to property in the country. These
three periods, Bonilla adds, revolve around different forms of interpreting
and weighing the three fundamental values in the liberal canon: autonomy,
equality, and solidarity. The first period, beginning in 1886 and ending in
1936, is marked by a classical liberal property regime in which the
Constitution and civil law form an ideologically coherent set that prioritizes
the principle of autonomy over the principles of equality and solidarity.
The second period, between 1936 and 1991, is structured by a mixed
system that recognizes the social function of property in the Constitution
but preserves an individualistic notion of property in the civil code. The
third and final regime of property, beginning in 1991 and still in effect
today, is an ideologically consistent constitutional and legal framework
committed to the idea that the right to property must be defined through the
principles of solidarity and equality. In his article, Bonilla argues that the
three periods comprising the recent history of the right to property in
Colombia are structured around a set of five conceptual oppositions:
individualism–solidarity; limited intervention–general intervention;
private–public; Constitution as political program–Constitution as norm; and
property as a right–property as social function. In his article, Bonilla
analyzes how these conceptual oppositions configure each of the key
periods in the recent history of property in Colombia.
In the second paper of this section, Alexandre dos Santos Cunha provides
an analysis of the social function of property in Brazil. 73 Cunha argues that
this theory enters the Brazilian legal system as a result of the influence of
Italian jurists Pietro Cogliolo and Enrico Cimbali. Cunha indicates that the
work of Duguit was not decisive for the reinterpretation of the classical
liberal concept of property in Brazil, as it was in other Latin American
72. See Daniel Bonilla, Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and
Property as a Social Function, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1135 (2011).
73. See Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, The Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 (2011).
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countries such as Colombia or Chile. Consequently, Cunha states, this
theory has not been interpreted in Brazil as imposing internal limits on
property. Brazilian courts, influenced by Cogliolo and Cimbali, have
understood that the social function is a justification of the power of the
legislature to create external limits to the exercise of property. Cunha also
argues that although the social function of property enters the Brazilian
legal system with the Constitution of 1934, it is only with the issuance of
the civil code of 2002 that this concept of property gains strength and
permeates the Brazilian legal system. Accordingly, Cunha’s essay analyzes
how the civil code of 2002 has influenced the way the Brazilian jurists
understand the social function of rights in general and the social function of
property in particular.
In the third article of this section, M.C. Mirow examines the
constitutionalization of the social function of property in Chile. 74 Mirow
thus examines the differences between the Constitution of 1833 and that of
1925 with respect to property. In particular, he makes explicit the
differences between the classical liberal concept of property that
characterizes the former, and the functionalist concept of property that
characterizes the latter. Similarly, Mirow studies the influence that Duguit
had on this change in the Chilean legal system. Mirow carefully analyzes
the debates among the members of the Constituent Assembly that drafted
the Constitution of 1925, and analyzes the impact that Duguit’s lectures in
Buenos Aires had on the social function of rights in these discussions.
Finally, Mirow discusses the role that President Arturo Alessandri played in
transforming the way property was conceived in the Chilean legal system.
CONCLUSION
As this set of papers illustrates, the ongoing academic discussion about
the social function of property has many dimensions. Moreover, the idea
that property owners owe social obligations to others can play out quite
differently across various legal, political, economic, and social systems.
Our goal in this symposium was to continue to add texture to the discussion
and to highlight the ways in which the social function of property has
operated in Latin American systems. We thank each of the authors for their
considerable contribution to this important topic and look forward to
continuing the conversation.

74. See M.C. Mirow, Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1183 (2011).

